Books in Celebration of the 150th Anniversary of the Origin of Species

2009 marks several important anniversaries in the science of evolutionary biology. Perhaps the two most important are the 200th anniversary of the birth of Charles Darwin and the 150th anniversary of the publication of his most important book, On the Origin of Species, originally published in November of 1859. Scientific societies around the world are celebrating these two events, with “Darwin Day” observances at hundreds of colleges, universities, and museums, including Cornell University and the Museum of the Earth at the Paleontological Research Institution in Ithaca, New York.

Publishers are also celebrating these two anniversaries, bringing out a flood of books on Darwin and evolution. There isn’t space in this blogpost to note all of these publications, but we can mention some of the most noteworthy and relevant of these publications. Here is an annotated list of some of the best and most comprehensive publications that have come out recently, celebrating the life and work of Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution by natural selection. The full publication information for each work is included in this list, followed by a brief paragraph describing its contents.

DARWIN'S BOOKS (in print)
Darwin, Charles (Edward O. Wilson, editor) (2005) From So Simple a Beginning: Darwin's Four Great Books. W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, NY, ISBN 0393061345 (hardcover, $39.95), 1706 pages. Available here.

Perhaps the best way to celebrate Darwin’s life and work is to read his most important and influential books. In preparation for the Darwin bicentennial several publishers have brought out various versions of his books. This one is the best, not only because it includes his four most influential publications, but also because the editor, evolutionary biologist Edward O. Wilson, provides a brief but illuminating introduction to each one. Wilson places Darwin’s work in its historical and scientific context, and shows how each of his four great books laid the groundwork for the modern science of biology. If you only have time for one of these books, let this compendium be the one you read this year.

Darwin, Charles (James T. Costa, editor) (2009) The Annotated Origin: A Facsimile of the First Edition of On the Origin of Species. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, ISBN 0674032810 (hardcover, $35.00), 576 pages. Available here.

Darwin didn’t originally intend to publish the book we now know as the Origin of Species. He was working on a much longer multi-volume work that he intended to call Natural Selection, and rushed to publish an “abstract” of this work in 1859 to forestall losing his priority for the idea to Alfred Russell Wallace. As a consequence, the Origin of Species has no footnotes, endnotes, nor bibliography. This version of the Origin makes up for that lack. Ably edited by James Costa, The Annotated Origin contains many of the annotations that the original Origin of Species lacked, and provides the reader with a comprehensive grounding in the natural history that Darwin marshaled in support of his revolutionary theory.

Darwin, Charles (David Quammen, editor) (2008) On the Origin of Species: The Illustrated Edition. Sterling Publishers: New York, NY, ISBN 1402756399 (hardcover, $35.00), 560 pages. Available here.

Darwin rushed to publish the Origin of Species, and included only one technical illustration in the first edition. This lack of illustrations has been rectified in David Quammen’s beautifully illustrated version of the Origin. Perhaps best known for his masterful book on island biogeography and extinction, The Song of the Dodo, Quammen has chosen a huge selection of images that illuminate Darwin’s theory in ways that Darwin himself would have found both fascinating and extremely valuable for a deeper understanding of his theory.

DARWIN'S BOOKS (online)

The Internet has provided readers and scholars today with an unparalleled opportunity to study the works of Darwin online. By far the best of these electronic resources is a website initiated and maintained by John Van Whye and his colleagues in England. Available online at http://darwin-online.org.uk/, The Complete Works of Charles Darwin includes not only all of Darwin’s books (available in all of their various editions), but also photographic facsimiles of these works side-by-side with searchable full text versions, plus all of Darwin’s scientific publications and a massive and growing collection of his voluminous correspondence. Here is a sampling:

Darwin, Charles (1845) Journal of Researches into the Natural History and Geology of the Countries Visited During the Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle Round the World, Under the Command of Capt. Fitz Roy, R.N. 2d edition. John Murray: London, UK, 536 pages. Text and images available here.

This was Darwin’s first and most popular book for the general public, establishing him as the premier naturalist in England at the time of its publication. Continuously in print since 1845, the Voyage of the Beagle (as it is most often referred to) is both a marvelous compendium of natural history and a fascinating journal of a voyage of discovery almost unparalleled in the literature of science.

Darwin, Charles (1859) On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. John Murray: London, UK, 522 pages. Text and images available here.

Darwin’s most important book, and perhaps the most important book ever published in the science of biology. Indeed, a strong argument could be made that this book single-handedly founded the modern science of biology. This online edition juxtaposes the text of the Origin with photographs of the corresponding pages from the first edition.

Darwin, Charles (1871) The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. John Murray: London, UK, 424 pages. Text and images available here.

Darwin’s second most important book, and perhaps the most controversial of his published works, the Descent of Man (as it is most often referred to) contains Darwin’s proposal that humans have evolved from “lower” primates, and a detailed exploration of what Darwin believed to be the most important mechanism in the evolution of humans: sexual selection. Darwin also speculates on the evolutionary origin of such uniquely human traits as art, language, and morality.

Darwin, Charles (1871) The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. John Murray: London, UK, 374 pages. Text and images available here.

One of Darwin’s lesser-known books, but no less important in its own way, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals is often credited with founding the modern science of animal behavior. In it, Darwin explored the biological basis for the expression of emotions in humans and other animals, with detailed examples (many with accompanying photographs) that show how human emotions are most probably derived from the emotions of other “lower” animals, including dogs as well as monkeys and other primates.

DARWIN'S LIFE AND WORK (adults/general)

Many people (including many evolutionary biologists) not only have never read Darwin's books, but also do not know how Darwin came to write them. Furthermore, opponents of Darwin's theories often portray Darwin's life and personal beliefs in as negative a light as possible, in an attempt to discredit his theories. Perhaps the best antidotes to both of these deficiencies are the books listed here, which together provide a comprehensive view of Darwin's life and work. Most of them are written for non-scientists, and all of them provide a fascinating glimpse into the work of the founder of the science of biology.

Browne, Janet (1996) Charles Darwin: A Biography, Volume 1: Voyaging. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, ISBN 0691026068 (paperback, $25.95), 622 pages. Available here.

Although not explicitly published in celebration of the Darwin bicentennial, Janet Browne’s two-volume biography of Darwin is widely recognized as the premier biography of the founder of evolutionary biology. This first volume covers Darwin’s youth and early career, up to the completion of the voyage of HMS Beagle and the germination of his theory of evolution by natural selection. Using the extensive collection of Darwin’s correspondence along with personal papers and those of his family and scientific associates, Browne draws a detailed and sometimes surprising portrait of the founder of the most comprehensive and controversial theory in the natural sciences.

Browne, Janet (2003) Charles Darwin: A Biography, Volume 2: The Power of Place. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, ISBN 0691114390 (paperback, $25.95), 600 pages. Available here.

In this second volume of Janet Browne’s two-volume biography of Darwin, Janet Browne explores the origin of the Origin of Species and Darwin’s other ground breaking and revolutionary works. Unlike some of Darwin’s other biographers, Browne gets most of the science right in her biography, and illuminates Darwin’s ideas in light of his detailed work in natural history. She also provides insights into Darwin’s personality, including his much-noted reclusive nature, and shows how his scientific work and ideas were influenced by events in his private life.

Darwin, Charles (Nora Barlow, editor) (1993) The Autobiography of Charles Darwin: 1809-1882. W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, NY, ISBN 0393310698 (paperback, $14.95), 224 pages. Available here.

Although Darwin wrote an autobiography, he never intended it to be a comprehensive history of his life or his ideas. Rather, he did it almost on a lark, as a kind of “gift” to the members of his family and closest friends. Despite this, his autobiography provides some fascinating insights into his personality, and especially his views on art, literature, religion, ethics, and philosophy. This edition includes autobiographical material that was suppressed by Darwin’s widow and son, and should be considered to be the definitive edition.

Darwin, Charles (Gordon Chancellor & John Van Wyhe, editors) (2009) Charles Darwin’s Notebooks from the Voyage of the Beagle. Cambridge University Press: New York, NY, ISBN 0521517575 (hardcover, $150.00), 650 pages. Available here.

This is an expensive, but absolutely invaluable publication, brought out by Cambridge University Press as part of this year’s bicentennial celebration and edited by Gordon Chancellor and John Van Whye (the same John Whye who maintains the complete works of Darwin online). It contains the entirety of Darwin’s handwritten journals of the voyage of HMS Beagle, written during the voyage. In it one can trace the development of Darwin’s revolutionary ideas as they first occurred to him, and see how the events of the voyage laid the groundwork for his revolutionary theories. This is a must-have edition for anyone who wants to understand how and when the Darwinian revolution began.

Desmond, Adrian & Moore, James (2009) Darwin's Sacred Cause: How a Hatred of Slavery Shaped Darwin's Views on Human Evolution. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: New York, NY, ISBN 0547055269 (hardcover, $14.95), 448 pages. Available here.

Charles Darwin was born on February 12, 1809, the same day as Abraham Lincoln. This propinquity of origins is all the more notable when one realizes that Darwin and his family were staunch abolitionists. Darwin himself tells how he became horrified by the institution of slavery while on the voyage of HMS Beagle.

Desmond and Moore, whose 1994 biography of Darwin (Darwin: The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist, available here) is widely recognized as one of the best biographies of Darwin, have in this volume dug deeper into Darwin’s personal history, showing how his views on slavery and its abolition helped shape his views on the evolution of humans, as outlined in his Descent of Man.

McCalman, Iain (2009) Darwin's Armada: Four Voyages and the Battle for the Theory of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, NY, ISBN 0393068145 (hardcover, $29.95), 432 pages. Available here.

Although perhaps the best known, Darwin’s round-the-world voyage aboard HMS Beagle was not by any means the only such voyage of discovery in the 19th century. Three of Darwin’s closest friends and collaborators in evolutionary biology — botanist Joseph Hooker, zoologist Thomas Henry Huxley, and professional collector and naturalist Alfred Russell Wallace — all participated in similar voyages, and all contributed to Darwin’s theories. McCalman describes all four voyages, and shows how the insights and information about natural history gained by these four great naturalists provided the foundation for the science of evolutionary biology in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Quammen, David) (2007) The Reluctant Mr. Darwin: An Intimate Portrait of Charles Darwin and the Making of His Theory of Evolution. Atlas Books: New York, NY, ISBN 039332995X (paperback, $35.00), 304 pages. Available here.

Quammen’s biography of Darwin’s personal origin of the Origin is a perfect companion to Janet Browne’s two-volume biography of Darwin. Focusing on the period in Darwin’s life leading up to the original publication of the Origin, Quammen shows how Darwin’s personality and early education predisposed him to the intellectual and emotional labor that resulted in the publication of the Origin and its reception by the scientific community.

DARWIN'S LIFE AND WORK (children/school)

All too often people think that the work of great scientists such as Charles Darwin is only accessible to adults, especially scientists. Here is a brief selection of books for children, all published during this bicentennial year, which present Darwin and his work in a way that anyone, including young children, can understand and appreciate.

Heiligman, Deborah (2009) Charles and Emma: The Darwins' Leap of Faith. Henry Holt and Co.: New York, NY, ISBN 0805087214 (hardcover, $18.95), 272 pages. Available here.

Heiligman’s biography of Charles and Emma Darwin begins with Charles drawing up a list of the pros and cons of marriage to his first cousin, Emma. His decision to marry her set in motion an emotional odyssey for Charles and Emma, who had very different views of religion. Charles’ theory of evolution threatened Emma’s deep religious belief, and forced Darwin to thoroughly document his views before publishing them. This sympathetic rendering of their happy, though sometimes turbulent, marriage is a wonderful introduction to the real life of a famous scientist, one that young adults will find particularly relevant to their own lives.

Lasky, Kathryn (2009) One Beetle Too Many: The Extraordinary Adventures of Charles Darwin. Candlewick Press: Somerville, MA, ISBN 076361436X (hardcover, $17.99), 48 pages. Available here.

Lasky’s copiously illustrated account of Darwin’s life and work, focusing especially on his adventures while on the voyage of HMS Beagle, gives younger readers an engaging look at the work of the founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Lasky does not shy away from Darwin’s views on evolution and religion, presenting them in Darwin’s own words. The illustrations are particularly charming, rendered in various media in a quirky and engaging style.

McGinty, Alice B. & Azarian, Mary (2009) Darwin, with Glimpses into his Private Journal and Letters. Houghton Mifflin Books for Children: New York, NY, ISBN 0618995315 (hardcover, $18.00), 48 pages. Available here.

Another illustrated account of Darwin’s life and work, this time covering his childhood, his adventures while on the voyage of HMS Beagle, and the subsequent development of his theory of evolution by natural selection. gives younger readers an engaging look at the work of the founder of the theory of evolution by natural selection. Illustrated with woodcuts and watercolor, McGinty and Azarian’s biographical history also touches on Darwin’s views on religion and philosophy in a way that is accessible to younger readers.

Schanzer, Rosalyn (2009) What Darwin Saw: The Journey That Changed the World. National Geographic Children's Books: Des Moines, IA, ISBN 1426303963 (hardcover, $18.00), 48 pages. Available here.

Schanzer’s illustrated account of Darwin’s voyage of HMS Beagle is more limited in scope than the others in this list, but succeeds in presenting Darwin’s natural history investigations in an engaging (and sometimes humorous) way. More like a graphic novel than a standard biography (complete with cartoon-like illustrations and speech balloons), Schanzer presents selected observations that led Darwin to his theory of evolution. Unlike the other three books for younger readers in this list, Schanzer avoids discussion of Darwin’s views on religion and philosophy, sticky strictly to the natural history of his historic voyage and the science that it inspired.

In addition to the books listed and reviewed here, those who are interested in the life and works of Charles Darwin can search Amazon.com, where most of the books listed above can be browsed, along with many others published in connection with the Darwin bicentennial. Books on the subject of evolution are listed here, including books both supportive of Darwin’s theory and critical of it.

I hope this list provides you with some ideas of how to celebrate Darwin's life and work by learning more about it.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Macroevolution: What Were the Evolutionary Ancestors of Whales?

ID supporters often assert that, although there is abundant empirical evidence for microevolution, there is no such evidence for macroevolution. One of the macroevolutionary transitions that they often cite is the evolution of whales from a land-dwelling ancestor. Which leads me to ask the following question:

What empirical evidence would verify (i.e. support) or falsify (i.e. undermine) the hypothesis that whales had evolved from a land-dwelling mammal? Please note that this is a hypothesis about macroevolution, not microevolution.

A basic principle of hypothesis validation in the natural sciences is that if one can find multiple lines of evidence, all of which support the hypothesis, then such evidence is much stronger than if there were only a single line of evidence. This is especially the case if the different lines of evidence are from very widely separated fields.

Until recently the main line of evidence for the evolution of whales (i.e. members of the mammalian order Cetacea) from even-toed ungulates (i.e. members of the mammalian order Artiodactyla) was anatomical. This anatomical evidence was derived from two sources:

1) similarities between the anatomy (especially skeletal anatomy) of living (i.e. "extant") Artiodactyls and Cetacea, and

2) an evolutionary phylogeny of the transition from terrestrial Artiodactyls to aquatic Cetacea, based on fossils.

Rather than summarize this comparative anatomical evidence here, I recommend that interested readers follow this link. What you will find is a fairly detailed summary of the evidence from comparative anatomy, all of it pointing to the conclusion that whales (i.e. Cetaceans) evolved from even-toed ungulates (i.e. Artiodactyls). It is this evidence that most evolutionary biologists have until recently cited as support for the macroevolutionary derivation of Cetaceans from Artiodactyl ancestors.

However, one can also ask the question Does the comparative genomics of Artiodactyls and Cetaceans support the same hypothesis? That is, are there observable DNA sequence similarities and differences that are similar in both scope and timing to the similarities and differences in the fossil record (and as reflected in the comparative anatomy of Artiodactyls and Cetaceans)?

This is an easily falsified hypothesis: If the genomic evidence does not support the Artiodactyl into Cetacean hypothesis — e.g. that Cetaceans evolved from some other clade, or that they had not evolved at all, but rather sprang into existence fully-formed and without genetic evidence of a macroevolutionary transition — then this evidence would not support the evidence from comparative anatomy and the macroevolutionary hypothesis based on comparative anatomy would be called into question.

So, what does the comparative genomic evidence indicate about the macroevolutionary relationships between the Artiodactyla and the Cetacea? Here’s a summary of the findings from comparative genomics:

The idea that whales evolved from within the Artiodactyla was based on analysis of DNA sequences. In the initial molecular analyses, whales were shown to be more closely related to ruminants (such as cattle and deer) than ruminants are to pigs. In order for the order name to reflect a real evolutionary unit, the term Cetartiodactyla was coined.

Later molecular analyses included a wider sampling of artiodactyls and produced a more complete tale. Hippos were determined to be the closest relative of whales, ruminants were related to a whale/hippo clade, and pigs were more distant. In addition to producing the controversial whale/hippo clade, these analyses debunked the idea that hippos and pigs are closely related. This had been a popular taxonomic hypothesis (Suiformes) based on similarities in morphological (physical) characteristics.

In addition to DNA and protein sequences, researchers tracked the movement of transposons called SINEs in the genome. A transposon is a DNA sequence that will occasionally make a copy of itself and insert that copy into another part of the genome. It is considered highly unlikely that SINEs will insert themselves into the exact same part of a genome by chance. The data indicate that several transposons inserted themselves at the same point in the genomes of whales, ruminants and hippos (sometimes referred to as "pseudoruminants" because although they have four-chambered stomachs like true ruminants, they do not chew the cud). This insertion point is not shared with camels and pigs.

This hypothesis has been tested with DNA sequences from a host of genes: the complete mitochondrial genome (as well as several of its genes independently), beta-casein, kappa-casein, von Willebrand factor, breast cancer 1, recombination activating genes 1 and 2, cannabinoid receptor 1, and several others. These sequence data and the transposons converge on the same conclusion that hippos and whales are more closely related to one another than either is to other artiodactyls.

Sequences analyzed in combined analyses with morphological characters have also produced the same results as sequences alone. Some have argued that the sheer number of characters (one for each nucleotide) in sequences swamps out the effects of morphology. There have been a few morphology-based studies that have suggested (weakly) the same results as the molecular results, but overall most morphological studies have conflicted with the whale/hippo hypothesis of Cetartiodactyla.

An important exception is a recent conducted by Boisserie et al. (2005). They examined 80 hard morphological characters of fossil and extant cetartiodactylan taxa. Their results suggest that hippopotamids evolved from within a clade of anthracotheres. That anthracothere/hippopotamid clade appears to be sister to the Cetacea and supports the molecular results.

[sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cetartiodactyla (summary article), where you can find links to many primary references]

Note that much of the genomic data (especially from transposon sequences) supporting the macroevolutionary hypothesis is based on non-adaptive DNA sequences. That is, DNA sequences that do not code for adaptive characteristics, and in many cases that do not code for anything at all. This is like figuring out which students have been copying the answers to test questions from other students by comparing their wrong answers. The right answers are the same for everybody, but wrong answers vary from student to student in virtually random ways. If two students have the same wrong answers, you can be reasonably confident that one of them copied the wrong answers from the other. You can then test this hypothesis by looking at seating charts, past test performance (cheaters are often identified by sudden increases in test scores without apparent increases in effort), and – often the last resort – asking them if they copied answers.

Conclusion: The empirical evidence from comparative genomics closely matches the empirical evidence from (both extant and fossil) comparative anatomy.

Is that all, or is there yet another line of evidence that might be pursued to verify or falsify the Artiodactyl into Cetacean hypothesis? Yes, there is. Consider the observable fact that whales reproduce much more slowly than even-toed ungulates (such as deer and hippos). Indeed, there is a general principle in zoology that the larger the members of a species are (on the average) the fewer offspring they have, the more widely spaced those offspring are in time, the fewer offspring they can have over their lifetime, and the longer the average lifespan of individuals.

For example, deer can have offspring every year, and under good conditions can sometimes have twins or even triplets in one reproductive cycle. By comparison, baleen whales can only have offspring every few years (it can take up to two years for one pregnancy in large baleen whales), they virtually never have more than one calf at a time, they have only a few reproductive life cycles per lifetime, and they have much longer lifespans than deer.

This means that, if Cetaceans evolved from Artiodactyls, one might be able to find empirical evidence that the rate of the macroevolutionary transition from Artiodactyl ancestors into Cetacean descendants had slowed down as the result of the increase in size, decrease in number of offspring per reproductive cycle, decrease in total number of offspring per lifetime, and increase in average lifespan. In brief, there might be evidence that the macroevolutionary “clock” slowed down as Cetaceans evolved larger and larger size.

Here’s the latest genomic evidence vis-a-vis this hypothesis:

Big and slow: phylogenetic estimates of molecular evolution in baleen whales (suborder mysticeti).
Molecular Biology and Evolution. 2009 Nov;26(11):2427-40. Epub 2009 Jul 31.
Jackson JA, Baker CS, Vant M, Steel DJ, Medrano-González L, Palumbi SR.
Marine Mammal Institute, Hatfield Marine Science Center, Oregon State University, OR, USA.

ABSTRACT: Baleen whales are the largest animals that have ever lived. To develop an improved estimation of substitution rate for nuclear and mitochondrial DNA for this taxon, we implemented a relaxed-clock phylogenetic approach using three fossil calibration dates: the divergence between odontocetes and mysticetes approximately 34 million years ago (Ma), between the balaenids and balaenopterids approximately 28 Ma, and the time to most recent common ancestor within the Balaenopteridae approximately 12 Ma. We examined seven mitochondrial genomes, a large number of mitochondrial control region sequences (219 haplotypes for 465 bp) and nine nuclear introns representing five species of whales, within which multiple species-specific alleles were sequenced to account for within-species diversity (1-15 for each locus). The total data set represents >1.65 Mbp of mitogenome and nuclear genomic sequence. The estimated substitution rate for the humpback whale control region (3.9%/million years, My) was higher than previous estimates for baleen whales but slow relative to other mammal species with similar generation times (e.g., human-chimp mean rate > 20%/My). The mitogenomic third codon position rate was also slow relative to other mammals (mean estimate 1%/My compared with a mammalian average of 9.8%/My for the cytochrome b gene). The mean nuclear genomic substitution rate (0.05%/My) was substantially slower than average synonymous estimates for other mammals (0.21-0.37%/My across a range of studies).

CONCLUSION: The nuclear and mitogenome rate estimates for baleen whales were thus roughly consistent with an 8- to 10-fold slowing due to a combination of large body size and long generation times. Surprisingly, despite the large data set of nuclear intron sequences, there was only weak and conflicting support for alternate hypotheses about the phylogeny of balaenopterid whales, suggesting that interspecies introgressions or a rapid radiation has obscured species relationships in the nuclear genome. [emphasis added]

So, there are indeed empirically falsifiable hypotheses for the macroevolution of whales from land-dwelling ancestors. If whales (Cetacea) evolved from even-toed ungulates (Artiodactyla), then the following predictions should be supported by the observable data:
• that there should be anatomical similarities between extant Artiodactyls and Cetaceans,
• that there should also be anatomical similarities between fossil Artiodactyls and Cetaceans,
• that there should be shared similarities and differences between the genomes of extant clades of Artiodactyls and Cetaceans, and that the overwhelming majority of these similarities and differences would mirror the comparative anatomical evidence for the macroevolutionary origin of the various clades of the Cetartiodactyla, and
• that the inferred slowing of macroevolutionary change during the transition from Artiodactyl ancestors to Cetacean descendants should also be consistent with the hypothesis that the rate of this transition would have slowed as the result of increasing body size, increasing reproductive spacing, decreasing numbers of offspring per life cycle, and increasing longevity.

And it is.

Clearly, an ID supporter might then ask for specific empirical evidence on how the various transitions occurred at the genetic and developmental level, and if these details could unambiguously distinguish between natural and supernatural causes for such genetic mechanisms. Evolutionary developmental biologists are currently working on answers to the first part, but I personally cannot imagine how one could empirically test the second part. Furthermore, it seems to me that invoking a supernatural cause for the macroevolutionary transition from Artiodactyls to Cetaceans would be unnecessary, and would add nothing whatsoever to our understanding of the mechanisms by which this transition occurred.

Ergo, if I were doing this research and publishing my results I wouldn’t mention it, as it would be completely unnecessary for a scientific explanation of this phenomenon.

Just out of curiosity, ask yourself how one might use any of the foregoing as positive or negative empirical evidence for the existence of God. I mention this because some evolutionary biologists believe they can use the data of evolutionary biology to disprove the existence of God, and some ID supporters believe they can use the data of evolutionary biology to prove the existence of God. Personally, I believe both attempts are misguided, pointless, and ultimately futile. That’s why I don’t make such attempts, and wonder why anyone would.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

The Darwinian Revolutions Video Series

The Darwinian Revolutions

An online video lecture series
in honor of the 150th anniversary
of the original publication of
Charles Darwin's Origin of Species


Produced by:
The Cybertower at Cornell University

Written, directed and narrated by:
Allen MacNeill, Senior Lecturer
The Biology Learning Skills Center
Ecology & Evolutionary Biology

Videography by:
Dina Banning

Sound Engineering by:
Colbert McClennan

Technical Direction by:
Becky Lane

Videotaped at:
The Museum of the Earth
The Paleontological Research Institution
Ithaca, New York

Voiceover Narration Recorded at:
Fall Creek Studios
1201 North Tioga Street
Ithaca, New York

Images Obtained at:
WikiMedia Commons
Stebbins/Simpson/Dobzhanky photo credit: Martin Tracey

Galapagos Video Credit:
Prof. William Provine

It's finally done! After more than a year of meetings, writing, image acquisition, videotaping, sound recording, editing, revising, captioning, and (most of all) thinking, our video series on the Darwinian revolutions is now online!

This series of six online videos is a brief introduction to Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection and its implications. Here is a brief synopsis of the six episodes (click on each episode title to go to the linked video):


Episode One: Darwinian Revolutions
We begin with an overview of the series, which has been released to coincide with the 150th anniversary of the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection revolutionized both the biological sciences and our understanding of ourselves and the world around us. In this episode we learn that Darwin's theory has itself evolved in the 150 years since it was published. We also learn that Darwin actually presented two theories:
• a theory of descent with modification from common ancestors, and
• the theory of natural selection, Darwin's mechanism for evolution.


Episode Two: Evolutionary Ancestors
Beginning with an overview of Darwin's predecessors, we learn how the idea of evolution by natural means alone goes back more than two thousand years, to ancient Greece and Rome. Democritus of Abdera first proposed the "ground rules" for naturalist evolution, which were later extended by the Roman poet and philosopher, Lucretius. However, these early naturalistic theories were eclipsed for almost two millennia by the ideas of Plato and Aristotle.


Episode Three: Lamarck's Theory
In the 19th century, Jean Baptiste Lamarck set the stage for Darwin's monumental achievement with his Philosophie Zoologique (published in 1809), which advanced a theory of evolution by means of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarck's theory was the first theory of evolution to include a testable mechanism for evolutionary change — the inheritance of acquired characteristics — and provides a useful comparison with Darwin's theory.


Episode Four: One Long Argument
Darwin, whose academic training at Cambridge University was in Anglican theology, became an acclaimed naturalist and science writer following the five-year voyage of HMS Beagle. Using the notes and specimens that he had collected during the voyage, Darwin spent twenty years refining his theory, first published in 1859, of evolution by natural selection.


Episode Five: Mendel and the Eclipse of Darwin
Darwin's theory of descent with modification was accepted by most scientists worldwide within ten years of its publication in 1859. However, his theory of natural selection was widely criticized, and by the turn of the 20th century was widely considered to be dead. However, the work of Gregor Mendel, who discovered the foundations of what we now call genetics, provided a mechanism by which Darwin's theory could be revived and expanded.


Episode Six: The Evolving Synthesis
In the final segment of this series, we visit the The Museum of the Earth in Ithaca, New York, whose director, Dr. Warren Allman, discusses the importance of such museums to the science of evolutionary biology. We also hear from Cornell professor William Provine, who discusses Darwin's work and its importance to the history and philosophy of biology. He tells us how Darwin's original theory of natural selection was integrated into the sciences of population genetics, ecology, physiology, paleontology, embryology, and botany, to produce a "modern synthesis" of evolutionary theory. Prof. Provine also tells us how the "modern synthesis" has continued to evolve, and that today is the most exciting time yet in the history of Darwin's scientific revolution.

This has been an exciting year: the 200th anniversary of the publication of Lamarck's Philosophy Zoologique, the 200th anniversary of the birth of Charles Darwin, and the 150th anniversary of the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. There have been many events marking these anniversaries, and there will be many more. As Will Provine says, the theory of evolution is more dynamic, more exciting, more widely accepted, and more widely applied than at any time in the past century and a half. With the accelerating pace of discoveries in evolutionary biology and their applications in biology, medicine, psychology, economics, and even literature and art, the 21st century shows all indications of being what the founders of the "modern synthesis" called it back in 1959: the "century of Darwin" and his theory of evolution by natural selection.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Why I Post Comments on Creationist and ID Blogs

A fellow blogger asked me recently "Why waste your time posting [at creationist and ID blogs] at all? You do not seem to have a receptive audience." Other people ask me why I generally treat creationists and ID supporters with respect, rather than taking every opportunity to heap scorn and ridicule upon them. Here's what I hope is an adequate explanation to both of these questions.

I post comments at creationist and ID blogs (when I have the time, which is definitely not all the time) because I expect that there are a lot of people who read these comments without participating directly in such debates. This is why I try to keep as civil a tone as possible, especially when my opponents use ad hominem arguments, character assassination, insults, and ridicule. The contrast between their tactics and mine undermines their credibility (and, by extension, that of their soi dissant “science”). Indeed, some commentator’s comments are so insulting that I refuse to respond to them, and I believe that this does not pass unnoticed by readers who are not yet irrationally committed to one side or the other.

Also, as a teacher (currently in my 35th year of teaching at Cornell University), I feel a professional responsibility to correct some of the more egregious misrepresentations and misunderstandings of the science of evolutionary biology which are promulgated at creationist and ID blogs. Some of these misrepresentations clearly stem from ignorance, and in a gratifying number of cases some the commentators whom I have corrected have thanked me for the information and references I have provided.

However, other misrepresentations are apparently part of a deliberate and ongoing effort to distort the public record and deliberately misrepresent the relevant scientific information for political and religious purposes. I strongly believe that this kind of mendacity should be exposed for what it is, and for what it isn’t (i.e. it isn’t science).

Furthermore, I have always tried to emulate the long-standing Quaker tradition of “speaking truth to power”, which is the opposite of “preaching to the choir”. It means confronting directly what I perceive to be misunderstanding (and what I perceive to be deliberate mendacity), rather than limiting my interactions to people with whom I already agree. I agree with Charles Darwin, who said that he paid much more attention to the criticisms of people who disagreed with him than the praise of people who agreed with him. Like Darwin, I find that debating with people with whom I disagree helps me greatly to clarify my own position on the relevant issues, and to help my opponents clarify theirs. I believe that it would be a terribly boring (and non-progressive) world in which everyone agreed upon every subject, and so I am grateful to some of the commentators here for helping me improve my understanding of the relevant issues and my ability to argue persuasively for what I perceive to be the best supported position.

Like Hegel, I believe that genuine synthesis usually arises out of the clash between thesis and antithesis, and that progress in human understanding is almost always gained at the price of diligence, honesty, and honor. As my fencing master often says, “a gentleman is always gracious and dignified in defeat, humble and gentle in victory”. I have to the best of my ability tried to account myself according to this standard of conduct, and believe that the world would be a better place if everyone tried to do so.

Finally, to the best of my ability, I try to “fight the good fight” in defense of what I understand to be an accurate description of reality. I expect my opponents to do the same. When they do, I tell them so. Indeed, if they do a good job, I congratulate them, especially if they persuade me to change my mind, as the result of sufficiently convincing arguments. However, when my opponents depart from honorable and honest argumentation and stoop to ad hominem attacks, character assassination, insults, and ridicule, I call them on it and I inform them in no uncertain terms that I will no longer respond to them.

The same principles apply to this blog, and can be read here.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Rescuing Darwin from His Detractors (and Supporters)

TITLE: Rescuing Darwin

AUTHOR: Paul Fayter

SOURCE: The United Church Observer

SUMMARY: Ever since the Origin of Species was first published 150 years ago, scientists and creationists have tried to spin the religious views of Charles Darwin their way.

COMMENTARY: This article by Paul Fayter (appearing on a website sponsored by The United Church Observer, a Christian organization) directly contradicts many of the assertions made by some evolutionary biologists and most ID supporters, including most of the egregious distortions in Benjamin Wiker's recent book,
The Darwin Myth: The Life and Lies of Charles Darwin.

Unlike Wiker and most ID supporters, Paul Fayter has spent a significant fraction of his professional life studying Charles Darwin and his work. Here's what he found:

- Darwin was not an atheist when he wrote the Origin of Species and therefore could not possibly have written it as an "apology" for his atheism;

- the most important factors in his eventual agnosticism were 1) the death of his daughter, Annie, and 2) his view that a benevolent deity would not have created a world with such horrors as parasites (and the indiscriminate death of innocents);

- that despite his agnosticism, Darwin remained a "practicing" member of both the Church of England and his local parish church;

- that despite his embrace of the science of evolutionary theory, he did not descend into a life of libertinism and immorality, nor did he distort his theory to support any political position (including eugenics or "social darwinism");

- he remained a dedicated scientist, a loving husband, a doting father, a devoted member of his parish, and an unwavering opponent of slavery and its concomitant evils; and

- he also remained what would now be considered to be a "theistic evolutionist" until his death.

Here is Faytor's conclusion:

Darwin was able to reconcile the power and glory of a good and loving God with nature's cold indifference and manifest cruelty - the infamous and pitiless "survival of the fittest" - by viewing struggle, pain, suffering and death not as the direct will of God but as the result of the impersonal operation of universal laws. The process of evolution by means of natural selection was deadly and wasteful, and yet, as Darwin concluded in The Origin, it had a higher, nobler purpose. Higher species would evolve. The Creator - the God of scientific theism - lawfully drew good out of evil and progress out of pain.

Near the end of his life, Darwin thought it impossible to conceive that "this immense and wonderful universe" was "the result of blind chance or necessity." No, it still seemed that the world had been willed into being. "I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man," he wrote in his autobiography, "and I deserve to be called a Theist." At the same time, Darwin believed that "the mystery of the beginning of all things" was simply unsolvable; and so he also declared, "I for one must be content to remain an agnostic."

All of this directly contradicts Wiker's biography of Darwin and the opinions of most ID supporters. Demonizing Darwin, especially when there are very good (and unbiased) biographies of Darwin (not to mention his own, very candid autobiography) does nothing to harm Darwin's scientific reputation. By contrast, the fundamental misunderstanding among many ID supporters of how real science is done does quite a bit to harm ID's scientific reputation.

Neither evolutionary biology nor ID will be advanced or forestalled as scientific enterprises by pro- or anti-hagiographies of Charles Darwin (or any other individual scientist or ID supporter). This will happen only when sufficient field and laboratory work has been done and the results published in reputable scientific journals to decide between them. So far ID supporters have chosen to pursue a political program and the vilification of world-renowned scientists, rather than do the requisite science. Until they decide to abandon ad hominem arguments and actually focus on the science, they will remain (like "scientific creationism") a cautionary footnote to the history of the triumph of evolutionary biology.

In closing, I find it quite significant that only ID supporters refer to Darwin as a "little God". Like all evolutionary biologists, I consider him to have been a dedicated and talented observer of nature and a genuinely good person, but (like all of us) a plain and simple (and, of course, fallible) human.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Evolution, Intelligent Design, and the Banana Diet

There has been a lot of speculation lately about the status of "intelligent design". Last December, I posted an essay on the demise of the Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness clubs. At that time it was clear that the IDEA club movement at American colleges and universities was dead. Despite protestations to the contrary, the available data indicate that this is still the case.

Which leads to a more interesting question: what is the current status of the intelligent design "movement"? This question is even more significant this month, as November 24th marks the 150th anniversary of the original publication of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species, the founding document of the science of biology and the most influential book ever published in the natural sciences. Although some ID supporters assert that ID is compatible with evolutionary theory, it is clear from even a cursory examination of their views that the majority of ID supporters are opposed to the idea of evolution in virtually all of its versions.

Which brings me to the point of this blogpost: what impact has ID had on mainstream evolutionary theory, and which of these alternative explanations for the origin of adaptations and the diversity of life is gaining in veracity and which is losing? One way to answer this question is to analyze the frequency with which the terms "evolution" and "intelligent design" appear in internet searches and in news stories in the mainstream media. To assess this, Google has a marvelous tool: Google Trends. The following two graphs were produced using Google Trends. I have copied the graphs directly from the relevant web pages, adding only the red line at 1.5 (on the Y axis) to make possible comparison of relative values.


The first graph (above) shows the frequency of the term "evolution" as it appeared in Google searches and in news articles on the web over the past six years. What the upper graph shows is that Google search volume for the term "evolution" has fluctuated over the past six years, but held relatively steady. The lower graph shows that there has been a steady increase in news articles about evolution over the past six years.


The second graph (above) shows the frequency of the term "intelligent design" as it appeared in Google searches and in news articles on the web over the same six years. As you can see, these graphs are markedly different than those for "evolution". These graphs show that prior to 2005 there were very few searches and almost no news stories for "intelligent design". In 2005 this pattern changed abruptly: by the end of the year, there were over ten times as many Google searches for the term "intelligent design", and a concomitant spike in news articles on the same subject. This spike corresponds to the Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School District trialin Dover, Pennsylvania, in the course of which the ID movement gained national attention. The decision in that trial, issued by Judge John E. Jones (a Republican, appointed by President George W. Bush), was widely hailed as a massive defeat for the ID movement.

This assessment is borne out by the remainder of the graph. As you can see, both internet searches and news articles on ID have declined precipitously since December of 2005, falling to almost unmeasurably low levels.


This graph (above), comparing the search volume and news article frequency of the terms "evolution" (in blue) and "intelligent design" (in red) is even more revealing. Here it can easily be seen that both search volume and news articles on "evolution" have consistently dwarfed those for "intelligent design", even during the period covering the Kitzmiller v. Dover trial. Furthermore, there is a steady upward trend in the frequency of news articles on evolution, while the frequency of news articles on intelligent design has fallen to almost unmeasurable levels.

So, what are we to make of these trends? Clearly, interest in evolution is on a steady upward course, which just as clearly reflects its importance in the sciences. As I have written elsewhere, the fundamental concepts of the theory of evolution by natural selection have been steadily spreading into all of the branches of biology, and have recently begun to transform such disparate fields as psychology, literature, and even diets and nutrition and art.

By contrast, interest in intelligent design exploded in 2005 and has crashed since then. What other phenomena exhibit this same "boom and bust" pattern? One such transitory phenomenon is the explosion in fad diets. For example, this graph shows the Google search volume and news article frequency for the term "banana diet" (the choice of this term was at least partly in honor of young Earth creationist and ID supporter, Ray Comfort):


The similarity between this graph (above) and the graph for "intelligent design" is striking, and is probably no accident. As many critics of ID have asserted, the ID movement has essentially consisted of a public relations campaign, rather than a scientific research program. Public relations campaigns, like advertising campaigns in general, often show the "boom and bust" pattern shown in the "intelligent design" and "banana diet" graphs. This is because public relations campaigns do not depend on veracity, but rather on appearance. The supporters of ID (such as the Discovery Institute in Seattle, WA) have consistently promoted ID as a scientific research program, but even a cursory examination shows that, while there is abundant evidence that ID is a quasi-religious movement, there is virtually no empirical research being conducted by its supporters.

And so, as we approach the 150th anniversary of the founding of the rapidly expanding science of evolutionary biology, we may note in passing that this anniversary can also be used to mark the demise of the ID movement, a phenomenon with all of the earmarks of a passing fad and all of the scientific content of the banana diet.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Memento mori: The Metaphysics of The Game

I just lost the game. And so have you, especially if you know what I'm talking about.

Some background: my eldest son, Conall, attended a highland dance camp this past summer. While he was there, he learned about The Game. Being obsessed with games in general and mind games in particular (like his dad), he came home and told us all about it, and has since reveled in telling us every time he loses the game. Since learning about The Game, I have myself announced the same to several of my classes at Cornell, each time to a chorus of groans.

So, how does The Game work?

The Game has only three rules:

1) Everyone is always playing The Game.

2) Whenever you think of The Game, you lose.

3) Having lost The Game, you must announce this to at least one other person (usually by saying or writing "I just lost The Game").

Some active players of The Game also assert that there are two corollaries:

4) You can lose The Game multiple times.

5) You can only lose The Game once every half hour.

That is, The Game "resets" after half an hour, so that having forgotten that you are playing, you can lose again and again and again...

Having lost The Game many, many times since Conall told me the rules, it has occurred to me that there is a metaphysical dimension to The Game. Thinking about The Game is essentially the same thing as thinking about one's own death. That is, The Game is a kind of memento mori. Most of us go through most of our lives without often thinking about the incontrovertible fact that all of us will, at some point in the indefinite future, cease to exist. We will all, in other words, "lose The Game".

There have been several times in my life when I have become bemused by the thought of my own mortality. The first time it happened I was four years old. We were living in an old farmhouse on Scott Road, east of Homer, New York, and I was walking up the stairs to my bedroom. Between one step and the next, it occurred to me that I would someday die - that I would cease to exist. This realization was very shocking to me, and came back into my mind steadily for some time.

But then, I forgot about it...for a while. Since then, I have gotten caught in the same "becoming aware of mortality loop" several times, and each time it has had the same quality as losing The Game. That is, it comes with a sense of "doubled consciousness", in which I have become conscious of my own stream of consciousness, and its eventual termination.

Many theologians (and some evolutionary biologists) have speculated that the origin of religion is grounded in the realization of personal mortality. From an evolutionary standpoint, the argument is as follows:

1) Individuals who avoid situations in which their lives are threatened survive (and can therefore reproduce) more often than individuals who do not avoid such situations.

2) Individuals who are aware of their own mortality are more likely to avoid situations in which their lives are potentially threatened.

3) Ergo, the cognitive operation in which one becomes conscious of one's mortality has adaptive value; that is, it can increase in frequency among the individuals that make up a population as the result of natural selection.

Some evolutionary psychologists (myself among them) have argued that the capacity for such cognitive operations is the basis for our evolved psychology, and that there is a positive feedback relationship between ideas like "mortality" (and The Game) and the underlying neurological wiring that facilitates the acquisition and transmission of such ideas. This idea, known as "gene-meme coevolution", was first and most rigorously explored by Charles Lumsden and Edward O. Wilson in their 1983 book, Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. The underlying ideas in their work were summarized in non-technical language in Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origin of Mind.

Having pondered both The Game and mortality, it seems quite plausible to me that our minds are indeed adapted to the kind of mental operation that results in both "losing The Game" and recalling our personal mortality. And so, I expect to go on losing The Game until I lose The Game...and now, having read this, so will you.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

What's So "Intelligent" About "Intelligent Design"?

Many of the debates about "intelligent design" (ID) that I have read online have focused on the defintion of "intelligent". This is not necessarily because we all agree what "design" means, but rather because we know even less about that quality we refer to with the term "intelligent". If one cannot define what one means by "intelligent", then any attempt to define or investigate "intelligent design" would seem to me to be a futile exercise.

Some ID supporters have suggested substituting the term "purposeful design" for the term "intelligent design". To me, this sounds almost redundant; after all, design is all about "purpose", isn't it? And if that's the case, then "purposeful design" reduces to "purposeful purpose" or "designed design". Furthermore, it's not clear to me that the terms "intelligent" and "purposeful" are necessarily interchangeable, or mean even similar things.

Many ID supporters seem most upset about the implication that evolutionary theory is "random". That is, the processes by which new characteristics of living organisms come into being are not necessarily the result of intentional design. To many of them, this would eliminate a supernatural force or deity as the causal factor in biological evolution. Ergo, if one is committed to the intervention in nature of a supernatural force or deity, one must deny a priori the possibility that new characteristics of living organisms can come into being without "intention".

However, it is not necessarily the case that "purposeful" (i.e. teleological) objects and processes are necessarily non-random. First of all, it seems to me that "purposeful" is not an antonym for "random". For example, consider a falling rock: its movement as it falls is most definitely not random. Neither its trajectory nor its acceleration are "random" at all. On the contrary, they are predictable to such a degree that we call the mathematical description by which we can predict the movement of falling objects a "law" - the "law of gravity".

Ergo, it seems to me that the best antonym for "random" is "predictable", in the sense of being able to predict successive states in a dynamically changing system.

Given the foregoing, what is the best antonym for "purposeful"? Forgive me, but I think the only reasonable answer is "non-purposeful". This then forces one to define what one means by "purposeful". To me, the best definition of a "purposeful" (or "teleological", if you prefer the more technical term) object or process is "a dynamical process (or component of a dynamical process) in which the dynamical entity's actions are actively and homeotelically regulated by a cybernetic process that functions according to a pre-existing program, the outcome of which is a specified end state.

A homeotelic process is one in which a dynamical entity reacts to external perturbations from its original trajectory in such a way as to regain its original goal orientation. For example, an arrow fired from a bow is not homeotelic, whereas a heat-seeking missile is. By the same logic, a snowflake growing in a supercooled cloud is not homeotelic, whereas a virus replicating in a host cell is.

In my opinion, most of the arguments about "intelligent design" founder, not on the definition of "intelligent" but rather on the definition of "design". If one focuses not on "design" but rather on "purpose" (i.e. teleology), much of the disagreement (like a boojum) vanishes softly and silently away.

Indeed, I think the qualifier "intelligent" is unnecessary, and quite possibly redundant. Why argue over something – that is, "intelligence" – that is indefinable without self-reference?

That is to say, "purpose" is very clearly and unambiguously defined in cybernetics, as Gregory Bateson and Norbert Weiner pointed out a half a century ago. "Purpose" (aka "teleology") are what this argument is really about, and so it would help immensely if all of the participants on both sides of the debate would define it in such a way as to render its presence or absence empirically verifiable.

The same could also be wished about "intelligence", but I see no real hope for this, given that virtually every definition of "intelligence" given in this thread (and all previous threads) is neither empirically verifiable nor applicable to simple systems such as those found in viruses or very simple cells. How "intelligent" is the lambda bacteriophage? Compared to a human, not much; compared to a crystal of sodium chloride, tremendously so. Indeed, what separates crystallized viruses from crystallized salts is precisely the "quality" that separates life from non-life and "purposeful" from "non-purposeful" things.

Termites build termite mounds using a surprisingly simple set of "decision rules". For example, one decision rule (which is clearly "wired in" to the nervous system of worker termites) is the rule to stack particles of sand on top of each other and glue them together using a material like saliva in such a way as to produce an arch (this is beautifully illustrated in E. O. Wilson's masterpiece, The Insect Societies). In Höldobler and Wilson's new book, Superorganism, they explain in detail how insect societies produce astonishingly complex, adaptive, functional dwelling places, "highways" (army and driver ants), "farms" and "pharmacies" (leaf-cutter ants), etc. without anything that remotely resembles what we would call "intelligence" or "consciousness" (remember, their brains are smaller than a poppy seed and their life spans are measured in days).

Furthermore, none of the instructions for doing all of this "design" is encoded directly into the DNA of any given social insect. Rather, the instructions are "compiled" from the individual activities of thousands of individual insects performing very simple, stereotyped actions (mostly coordinated by chemical pheromones). In other words, the "intelligence" that produces the marvelous structures and functions of insect societies is a collective "intelligence" consisting of a small set of "decision rules" hard-wired into the nervous systems of individual insects.

Might it not be the case that this same process is the paradigm for all biological complexity? This would not only explain where the "designer" is (it's all around / inside us) and who the "designer" is (it's everyone, interacting collectively in producing the "superorganism"), it would also present what ID has so far completely lacked: an empirical research program. That is, one could search for the "decision rules" that produce biological complexity, in viruses, cells, insect societies, primate societies, and human societies, and figure out how the interaction of such rules produces biological complexity. And when you did that, you would have recreated the already-existing field of biology known as sociobiology, which is a branch of evolutionary biology.

Termites do not have "goals and foresight". Rather, they are quite literally programmed (i.e. "hard wired") to perform a surprisingly simple set of simple behaviors. They are born with this capability and do not have to learn it. Furthermore, their behaviors are extremely stereotyped and subject to quite a bit of essentially "random" variation. Despite this, and because there are so many of them (literally millions in some large hives), they collectively produce structures and functions that rival the most complex "artificial" factories and dwelling places designed by humans.

The point here is that "intelligence" is not being defined well at all, if it is restricted to humans and higher vertebrates, but not to insect societies. Each insect is definitely not "intelligent" (any more than each of our individual cells is), but collectively both the insect societies and our multicellular selves are intelligent. "Intelligence" is therefore an emergent property, rather than a pre-existing attribute. And evolution, of course, is all about emergent properties.

One of the points I tried to make earlier is that using human "intelligence" as a yardstick for intelligence in general is like using a Cray XMT as your yardstick for evaluating the "intelligence" of an abacus. In virtually every discussion I have read about "intelligence" at ID blogs, there seems to be an unspoken yet universal assumption that "intelligence" is an either/or phenomenon: either something is at least as intelligent as a human (or the Intelligent Designer aka God) or it isn't intelligent at all.

How "intelligent" a virus like the lambda bacteriophage? If "intelligence" is to be a useful (not to mention empirically measurable) phenomenon, it seems to me that it should fall somewhere along a spectrum, from the "intelligence" manifested by simple viruses up through the "intelligence" manifested by complex animal societies such as ours.

The latter point - that "intelligence" must somehow be massively multiplied as the result of social/collective interactions - is also non-trivial. As I pointed out earlier, an individual termite is extraordinarily "stupid", especially by human standards. Indeed, taken out of their social contexts, the behaviors of most social organisms seem pointless and almost random. However, what appear to be pointless and virtually random behaviors when viewed at the individual level become extraordinarily complex and "hyper-intelligent" when one moves up in organizational levels in animal societies.

How "intelligent" would each of us be, if we were forced to live in complete isolation from all other humans? If we were forced to do so from birth, our "intelligence" would be so limited as to result in almost instant death. Ergo, if one uses "able to live independently" as one's criterion for "intelligence", one would have to conclude that oak trees are immensely more intelligent than humans.

In my opinion, until ID theory comes to grips with the concept of "intelligence" in such a way as to make it both empirically verifiable and quantifiable, ID "theory" will continue to be not much more than unsupported speculation.

As a first approach to an operational definition of intelligence, consider whether learning is a necessary component of intelligence. Several commentators have strongly implied that this is the case. That is, the more an entity is capable of "learning", the more intelligent it is.

However, using the ability to learn as a criterion for intelligence is fraught with difficulties. For example, termites do not learn to build termite mounds, yet virtually everyone in this thread has agreed that mound-building behavior in termites indicates that termites (at least as a group) are indeed intelligent. Ergo, it is quite clear that an entity that is utterly incapable of "learning" can still qualify as being highly "intelligent".

This would also apply to some ID supporter's assertion that the Intelligent Designer is the God of the Abrahamic religions. This entity is universally recognized as being a "4-O deity": that is, He is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient. However, this last quality also strongly implies that the ID/God does not learn from His actions, as to do so would be directly contradictory with His being forever omniscient (i.e. from the beginning to the end of time, assuming that time does indeed end). Ergo, the ability to learn is quite clearly not a criterion for determining intelligence, if one assumes that the Intelligent Designer of ID theory is the God of the Abrahamic religions.

If one is familiar with so-called "expert systems" in computing, the same would be the case. Expert systems (ESs) do not "learn" to do anything in the sense that animals with "wet" minds do. On the contrary, an ES performs a complex (sometimes recursive) calculation using data embedded in one or more "truth tables", producing a calculated outcome. This outcome is sometimes hedged with statistical error calculations, but it is a calculated (i.e. not learned) outcome nonetheless. While the final calculation produced by an ES can be modified, this happens only when the values in the "truth tables" are modified. Otherwise, the outcome is simply a calculation. Ergo, expert systems do not actually "learn" anything, at least in the same way that animals (and some other living organisms) do.

So, I believe that it is fair to conclude that the ability to "learn" is quite clearly not a necessary criterion for intelligence. Some highly intelligent entities (such as termite colonies and the God of Abraham) are clearly incapable of true "learning". Conversely, some very unintelligent entities, such as bacteria, are nonetheless capable of changing their behavior over time in response to changes in their environment (the standard operational definition of "learning" in the cognitive sciences).

CONCLUSION: Intelligence is fundamentally unrelated to the ability to learn.

Which brings us back once again to the fundamental question: what is "intelligence", how can it be observed, and can it be quantified in any way? If not, then ID is quite literally a "science" without an empirically definable subject, and therefore a pointless exercise in mental masturbation.

One might also be tempted to define "intelligence" as "adaptability". That is, an "intelligent" entity has the ability to adapt its behavior (and, presumably, its underlying cognitive machinery by means of which its behavior is generated and regulated) in response to changes in its environment. However, this presents two serious problems to an ID supporter:

1) "Adaptability" is what natural selection is all about. Why posit the existence of an "intelligent" entity that is capable of "adapting" to changes in the environment, when this is precisely what natural selection is supposed to be able to do?

2) Since ID is supposed to be a theory that explains adaptation, then saying that the Intelligent Designer (i.e. the entity that moulds adaptations) is adaptable is essentially defining "intelligence" via constructing a tautology:

• "intelligence" = "ability to produce adaptations"

• "intelligent design" = the process by which adaptations are created

Ergo, "intelligent design" reduces to "adaptability producing adaptations".

This is what is sometimes referred to in logic as the "dormative principle" argument, from Moliere's "The Imaginary invalid". When asked how or why opium produces sleep, the learned doctor replies "because it contains a 'dormative principle'"; that is, it causes sleep because it contains a material that causes sleep. In the same way, defining "intelligence" as "the ability to adapt to changes in the environment" (including changes that have not yet happened, i.e. foresight) reduces to "design that is 'adaptable' because it is 'adaptable'".

Where does this leave us in a search for an empirically quantifiable definition of "intelligence"? And if the answer is, "nowhere", then where does this leave "intelligent design"?

In the same line of argument, one clearly cannot define "intelligence" as "that principle/process/quality by which complex specified information is produced". To do so would once more be arguing via tautology:

Question: What produces "complex specified information"?

Answer: Intelligence.

Question: What is "intelligence"?

Answer: That principle/process/quality that produces complex specified information.

Ergo, "the principle/process/quality that produces complex specified information" is what produces "complex specified information".

Again, a pointless exercise in semantic gymnastics.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

How Not To Fight A "Culture War"

There has been an interesting and often heated discussion about "methodological naturalism" taking place at Uncommon Descent. After more than 350 comments, the dispute about what "methodological naturalism" was, and how long scientists have been practicing it was resolved in the way that most such discussions are resolved: with the participants agreeing to disagree.

I think it would be interesting for both sides in the debate around methodological naturalism (MN) to consider why this term has become so widely used in recent times. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the entire concept of MN only became "solidified" following Paul de Vries' coinage of the term in 1983. Also for the sake of argument, let us concede that prior to that time the use of "non-natural" assumptions was indeed legitimate for at least inspiring scientific research (as, indeed, history shows us was clearly the case). Let us then further assume that the current application of MN does indeed exclude any reference to "non-natural causes", either in the design of experimental tests of hypotheses or in their interpretation.

One might then reasonably ask, "What happened in the early 1980s that prompted such a dramatic shift in the perception of scientists, so dramatic that it led most scientists to reject what had previously been allowable: that is, the use of "non-natural" hypotheses as an inspiration for scientific research (if not necessarily also in the interpretation of the results of such research)?

I believe that if one examines what was happening the early 1980s vis-a-vis evolutionary biology, the answer to this question is obvious: the rise of "scientific creationism" (especially of the "young Earth" variety) as a political force in the U.S., culminating in the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)'s decision in Edwards v. Aguillard (
482 U.S. 578) in 1987. During the 1960s, American science was promoted very vigorously, both by the U.S. government and by scientists themselves, as a reaction to scientific advances by the Soviet Union (particularly the launching of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite). Part of this promotion involved the formulation of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) protocol and its associated textbooks (the "blue", "green", and "yellow" versions). All three versions stressed evolutionary theory as providing a foundation for the biological sciences. This was virtually the first time since 1925 (and the conviction of John T. Scopes for having violated Tennessee's Butler Act by teaching evolution in a public school classroom) that evolutionary theory had been so prominently featured in biology textbooks that were widely promoted in the American public school system.

This caused an immediate negative reaction among American evangelical Christian groups. Legislative bans on the teaching of evolution similar to the Butler Act were either reinstated or promoted in several states. At the same time, Henry Morris and other "scientific creationists" founded and promoted the "scientific creationism" movement, which sought to provide scientific evidence for their version of "young Earth creationism" (YEC). Not much actual science was done by these self-described YECs, but strenuous political efforts were undertaken to have their YEC reinterpretations of existing scientific information incorporated into public school curricula in several states (most notably Arkansas and Louisiana).

In reaction to these efforts by YECs, the scientific community partnered with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and allied organizations to bring such efforts to the attention of the SCOTUS, with the intention of having them outlawed as violating the first amendment to the US constitution. These efforts were ultimately successful, as both laws banning evolution from public school science classes and the attempts to insert YEC in public school science classes were struck down as unconstitutional by the SCOTUS. These events, and not the subsequent rise of Intelligent Design (ID), are the context within which the adoption of MN by the scientific community in the 1980s can most effectively be viewed.

From my interactions with them, I have found that some ID supporters are very strongly in sympathy with the YECs, and view ID as a way of getting their version of YEC back in the public schools. This was clearly the case in the Dover Area school board's 2005 attempt to provide students with alternative biology textbooks incorporating ID, as shown by the sworn testimony by several of the members of that school board and other members of the board who were present at meetings at which this plan was discussed and approved.

However, in my interactions with other ID supporters (and especially the members of the Cornell IDEA Club and some commentators at Uncommon Descent), I have come to understand that a significant fraction of ID supporters do not accept that YEC is a legitimate empirical science, nor support it's incorporation in public school science curricula.

The dispute that has occurred in this thread (and similar recent disputes elsewhere) seem to me to be examples of people "fighting the last war" rather than dealing with the situation as it exists today. ID supporters who are not YECs need to understand that most evolutionary biologists lump the two together, partly because of the behavior of the Dover Area school board and similar, more local situations in which YECs have persisted in pushing their views into the public schools. At the same time, evolutionary biologists and their political supporters need to understand that there is no necessary connection between YEC and ID, nor are they united in their conviction that YEC and ID must be incorporated into the public school curriculum today.

A recognition of the political contexts within which both evolutionary biologists and Intelligent Design supporters have come to their positions, and what these contexts imply about the value of possible further actions would be valuable for both sides in this debate. I have had many ID supporters say privately to me that Dover was a disaster for ID, and especially for its quest to be accepted as a legitimate empirical science. I have also had many evolutionary biologists express to me their opinion that there is essentially no difference between YEC and ID, a viewpoint that I have learned through experience is clearly in error.

Ergo, I have concluded that the most effective way to move forward in this debate is the way I have been conducting it since the mid-1990s. That is, to invite supporters of both sides of the debate to make presentations in my evolution courses and seminars at Cornell and to conduct such debates in public forums such as this website. Ironically, I find this venue to be much more congenial to such debates than places like AtBC, in which character assassination is the order of the day, rather than the last resort of people who are either confused about their own position or uncertain about its logical force.

And so, I recommend that all participants in this debate avoid name-calling and ad hominem arguments. For each committed commentator on both sides of this issue, there are many thousands of quiet observers who are trying to come to their own conclusions about the issues being debated. While mud-slinging is fun, it's fun in the same way that smoking or drinking heavily is fun; it provides short-term personal gratification, but in the long term it undermines everything one is trying to accomplish.

I believe that clarity should be our goal, not necessarily agreement. If we come to clarity about our positions and agree to disagree, then we have accomplished a great deal more than we would have accomplished if our goal was simply to attack our opponents' characters or to question their personal motives. Going forward I will do my best to pursue this course of action, and recommend that all who genuinely wish to come to clarity on these issues and, by doing so, help the "silent watchers" of this forum to do so as well, treat each other as colleagues (in the "collegiate" sense of that word) in their pursuit of what they perceive to be the truth, rather than as enemies in a culture war.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

More on Teleology in Evolutionary Biology

I’ve been corresponding via email with a fellow evolutionary biologist (who shall remain nameless). I thought that some of her/his comments might be useful or interesting to those who read this blog, as they have a direct bearing on the "problem" of purpose (i.e. teleology) in evolutionary biology.

My correspondent's comments and questions are in block quotes:

I’ve been following the ‘Survival of the Sickest’ thread at Uncommon Descent, and have some comments on it and on your essay on the (un)reality of adaptations.

First, a major area of agreement between us is that the original post is fatally flawed by:

1) the assumption that “Darwinism” implies “constant progress”, and

2) failure to understand that fitness is always defined relative to a particular environment, and that environments change over time.

Now, on to some points of disagreement:

You mentioned Gould and Vrba’s 1982 paper on exaptation, and wrote:

"The reason is quite simple: if (as Gould, Lewontin, and Vrba argue) adaptation isn’t legitimately part of what evolutionary theory is about, then the whole idea of “design” and “function” is read completely out of evolution, leaving only descent with modification."

I have been very strongly influenced on this topic by Warren Allman, director of the Paleontological Research Institute here in Ithaca. He asserted that all adaptations should be considered to be exaptations. His rationale for this assertion was that the term “adaptation” has built into it an assumption of teleology. Literally translated, the word "adaptation" means “toward usefulness”. It’s the “toward” part that is the problem. As you and I both understand it, evolution (including natural selection, but not artificial selection) does not tend toward anything. It has no goal as far as we can tell. Ergo, it builds on what has gone before, but without any specific goal “in mind”.

This is why “exaptation” expresses better how we understand natural selection. It builds “away from” non-functionality (or even away from previous functionality), but never really “toward” anything at all as far as we can tell. And, if Sewall Wright’s “shifting balance” theory is a reasonable model of evolution, then it never really “arrives” anywhere at all, since the “goal” is constantly shifting anyway.

I’m wondering why you think that Gould and Vrba regard adaptation as being outside the legitimate scope of evolutionary theory. My take on the paper is not that they regard the concept of adaptation as illegitimate, but just that it has been typically construed too broadly and should be broken down into the categories of true ‘adaptation’ and ‘exaptation’, where they define a true adaptation thusly:

“Following Williams, we may designate as an adaptation any feature that promotes fitness and was built by selection for its current role.”

The problem I have with this definition is the inclusion of the words “promotes” and “for”. “Promotion” means exactly what it says: “motion towards” something. Ergo, using this word immediately suggests teleology, and as I have pointed out above, teleology cannot be a valid assumption in the origin of the products of evolution at any level. This is not because including teleology allows for “a divine foot in the door” (c.f. Lewontin, 1997), but rather because it requires that the “plan” for the teleological process must exist prior to the coming into being of that process. When we do things, this assumption is perfectly valid, but when something happens in nature, such an assumption is entirely unwarranted. Where, in nature, could such a pre-existing plan exist?

As for the word “for, I always point out to my students that teleological explanations virtually always reduce to sentences that include the phrase “in order to”. This can be shortened even further to “to” (leaving out the “in order”). However, the entire phrase “in order to” can be replaced with the word “for” without changing its meaning. Ergo, the definition quoted above is still irreducibly teleological, and therefore includes an assumption that we should not make in evolutionary biology.

In my paper on the evolution of the capacity for religious experience, I began with a succinct definition of “adaptation”, from which I lay out four criteria that a characteristic (i.e. a “trait”) must meet to be considered a genuine adaptation.

An evolutionary adaptation is any heritable phenotypic character whose frequency of appearance in a population is the result of increased reproductive success relative to alternative versions of that heritable phenotypic character.

Here are the four criteria that I believe must be met for a characteristic to be considered to be an adaptation:

1) An evolutionary adaptation will be expressed by most of the members of a given population, in a pattern that approximates a normal distribution;

2) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with underlying anatomical and physiological structures, which constitute the efficient (or proximate) cause of the evolution of the adaptation;

3) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with a pre-existing evolutionary environment of adaptation (EEA), the circumstances of which can then be correlated with differential survival and reproduction; and

4) An evolutionary adaptation can be correlated with the presence and expression of an underlying gene or gene complex, which directly or indirectly causes and influences the expression of the phenotypic trait that constitutes the adaptation.

I would now modify criterion #4 to state that such genes/gene complexes must be shown to have been conserved, relative to other sequences in the genome. However, one must keep in mind that such conservation, while necessary, is not sufficient. As we know now, some sequences are conserved, but can be knocked out, with no discernible effect on phenotype. Ergo, to fully satisfy criterion #4, a characteristic must be shown to be associated with a particular gene or gene complex, the knocking out of which can be shown to have significant negative effects on fitness.

Obviously, this means that a great many characteristics that we observe in living organisms will not qualify as adaptations. I believe that this is fully justified, following Williams’ assertion that the concept of adaptation is “onerous” and should only be resorted to “in the last resort”. It is only by doing so that we may avoid the otherwise almost inevitable pitfall of appealing to teleology in our explanations.

Gould and Vrba close their paper with this:

“The argument is not anti-selectionist, and we view this paper as a contribution to Darwinism, not as a skirmish in a nihilistic vendetta. The main theme is, after all, cooptability for fitness. Exaptations are vital components of any organism’s success.”

There’s that nasty little word “for” again! Fitness is immediately measurable as relative differential reproductive success, but “adaptation” can only be legitimately inferred retrospectively. We can’t say that something is a genuine adaptation until it already is, and this seems to me the kind of logical circularity that has also plagued Herbert Spencer’s phrase “survival of the fittest”. If we stick to the four criteria listed above, we will rarely fall into the trap that teleological thinking always sets for us.

Also, you later wrote the following, which seems to acknowledge that Gould and Vrba did regard adapation as a legitimate part of evolutionary theory:

“Yes, indeed, except that I believe that Gould, Lewontin (and later, Vrba) were, like Darwin, unwilling to take their principles to their logical conclusion: that adaptations (like species) are a figment of the human imagination, and do not actually exist in nature (or, to be even more precise, do not have to exist in nature).”

What I meant by this is that the only way we can actually “detect” the presence of adaptation is by inferring it. In that sense, adaptations are not “primary” characteristics; that is, characteristics that can be directly observed (such as differential reproductive success). Rather, such “secondary” characteristics must be indirectly inferred. In that sense, they are indeed “imaginary”; we must “imagine” that they exist (as the result of our application of inferential logic), as we cannot observe them directly.

Am I missing something? Are you trying to say that although Gould and Vrba regarded adaptations as real, they nevertheless thought they should be excluded from evolutionary theory?

No, I’m saying what Williams was saying, only I’m saying it more strongly and consistently: that we should never include any hint of teleology in our explanations, as such inclusion includes the biological equivalent of that old bugaboo of physics: “action at a distance” in physics is the equivalent of “goals preceding causes” in biology.

When I reread Williams’ famous 1966 book, Adaptation and Natural Selection, which supposedly reads teleology out of evolutionary biology, I was astonished to find it shot through with the same kind of teleological reasoning that he was supposedly trying to eliminate. I think I could find all the “hidden teleology” in Williams because I have spent so much time debating with ID supporters. They are the ultimate teleologists, and can always find where we have subtly woven teleological assumptions into our biology.

Finally, you wrote:

“To be as clear as I can, I believe that asserting a position of “metaphysical materialism” is just that: a metaphysical, not a scientific assertion. Confusing metaphysics with science is nearly as pernicious as confusing “ought” and “is”. The former makes for questionable science and the latter makes for questionable ethics.”

I would agree that science has no say on metaphysical questions that don’t have observable consequences (although I would argue that even then, Ockham’s razor should cause us to prefer simpler metaphysical systems to needlessly complex ones). However, some metaphysical assertions do have observable consequences. For example, I consider the existence of the Young Earth Creationists' God to be a metaphysical assertion that has nevertheless been decisively falsified by science.

I agree, but the same cannot be said for the more subtle versions of teleology found in Michael Behe or William Dembski's works. Their books (especially Dembski’s) present a much more subtle and less easily refuted version of teleological explanation, one that is easily reinforced by our own unwitting resort to teleological explanations.

Evolutionary adaptation is where the rubber of both evolutionary theory and ID hit the road.

Now on to your essay “Are Adaptations ‘Real’?”

You wrote:

“...although there are characteristics of organisms that are correlated with relatively high reproductive success (and would therefore be considered by most evolutionary biologists to qualify as “adaptations”), it becomes problematic to decide exactly which of those characteristics are the “real” adaptations and which are merely ‘accidental’”.

The problem, of course, is the words “real” and “accidental”. If we are genuinely dedicated to rooting out teleology in all of our explanations of the origins of biological objects and processes, then all adaptations are “accidental”, in the sense that they are all unplanned. We perceive them as having “functions” because our naive viewpoint of reality is always teleological. We can think non-teleologically only with very great difficulty. It’s like special relativity or quantum mechanics. We have to twist our minds to be able to even begin to conceive of them, and even then we constantly slide back into our naive (and unwarranted) views of reality.

True, if by “accidental” adaptations you mean exaptations. But while it may sometimes be difficult to tell whether an adaptation is “real” or “accidental”, that is not evidence that “real” adaptations don’t exist. Indeed, the only scenario I can envision in which “real” adaptations would not exist would be one in which every fitness-enhancing feature was an exaptation.

Exactly!

But that would mean, among other things, that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of changes that were selected for some reason other than improved vision. That seems far-fetched to me. Am I misunderstanding your position?

It’s not that that every incremental improvement to the eye would have to have been the accidental result of something, it’s that every incremental change to the eye would have had to originate accidentally, but then increase in frequency as the result of differential survival and reproduction. If we think the way you worded it (and we almost always think that way), then the teleological trap is that all of the incremental changes are somehow “predestined” and that complex eyes must be the inevitable result.

But this just plays into the hands of intelligent Design supporters. When we argue that “half an eye is still adaptive” we unwittingly include the assumption that “half an eye” is just that: half of what will ultimately evolve by natural selection. But our knowledge of the natural history of vision has shown us over and over again that “half an eye” is the whole thing in many cases. We can only say that the eyes of, say, flatworms, are “half an eye” because we already know that such a thing as a “whole eye” exists in cephalopods and vertebrates. We have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that any characteristic is only partially the whole deal. All characteristics of all organisms are the whole deal for those organisms, period, end of story, that’s all She wrote. Anything else contains the beginnings of teleology, and that way lies error, endlessly compounded.

We now have the ability to selectively delete individual characteristics from many different organisms. This makes possible something that natural selection does not: the precise determination of the selective “value” of particular characteristics. This has already been done, and the surprising outcome has been that even some gene sequences that were thought to have been very important in selection (due to having been “conserved” over deep evolutionary time) are apparently insignificant or useless. We know this because knocking them out of the genome has no discernible effect on the survival or reproduction of the “knock-out” progeny.

Precisely my point, above.

That interpretation seems to depend on the hidden assumption that the environment hasn’t changed significantly in the recent history of the organism, and that the experimental environment is fully representative of the historical environment over the entire time during which the features in question evolved. In the case of knocked-out sequences that have no apparent effect on fitness, how sure are we that the experimental environment is fully representative in this way?

No, but to assume that we are making the opposite mistake - assuming that some characteristic really has some function, even if that function is entirely unobservable - is once again to fall into the “teleology trap”. This is essentially the same argument that ID people make about “junk DNA”. Just because we haven’t found any function for it, doesn’t mean that all of it has no function. They argue that all of it must have some function. They are, like the evolutionary biologists for whom Williams, Gould and Lewontin, and Gould and Vrba wrote their warnings about, assuming teleology in evolution: they are, in a word, “pan-adaptationists”.

As a hypothetical example, imagine a bacterial DNA sequence that is expressed only during the formation of spores to protect the organism during periods of extreme environmental conditions. Knock out the sequence and test the viability of the resulting variant. If the experimental environment doesn’t include the extreme conditions that induce spore formation, the organism will never attempt to express the knocked-out sequence, and so its absence will not be noticed. If the experimenter concludes that the sequence is insignificant or useless, she is mistaken.

True, but I would strongly prefer that adaptation be considered a “diagnosis by exclusion” rather than our first and most important resort. By focusing on adaptation and natural selection, we teeter on the edge of the “teleology trap” and often (maybe even usually) fall in, despite our best efforts to avoid doing so.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Why Intelligent Design Supporters Insist That ID Must Be True

It has taken me a very long while, but I think I finally understand why Intelligent Design (ID) exists, why websites like Uncommon Descent exist, and why the regular commentators who support ID at those websites are so determined to assert the absolute reality of ID, in spite of a complete lack of empirical evidence.

It’s all right here in this quote about the ultimate justification for morality:

“Of course [the validity of an objective moral code] is all dependent upon the truth of the existence of God and the truthfulness of scripture - most of us here are aware of that.”

I believe that this is the crux of the whole science versus ID debate: if there is no empirical evidence for the existence of God, then it all comes down entirely to pure, unsupported supposition. Yes, one can assert that God exists, and can assert that therefore whatever God asserts must, by definition, be the absolute objective truth, but by the standards of scientific logic (which are now almost universally accepted as providing the most reliable evidence for descriptions of reality), arguments based purely and solely on assertion are no longer considered valid.

Ergo, without some independent source of evidence – independent of the original assertion, that is – then it all comes down to dueling assertions, which means that eventually it all comes down to force majeure: whoever can make the most forceful assertion gets to define the Truth.

Therefore, there must be some kind of empirical evidence for the existence of God. The fact that no one has ever found any is completely irrelevant, and will remain so indefinitely. It also explains why it is perfectly legitimate to deliberately distort, misinterpret, omit, or otherwise alter empirical evidence if it does not support the otherwise unsupportable assertion that God exists. [1]

Here is the way it looks to me:

Condition #1:

• If a moral code is not objective, it is ipso facto invalid.

• The moral code asserted by God is the only objective moral code. [2]

• If God does not exist, then there is no basis for the assertion that there is an objective moral code.

• Therefore, if God does not exist, anything is permitted.

Condition #2:

• An argument supported purely by assertion(s) is invalid. [3]

• Ever since Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum, it has generally been considered necessary that there should be empirical evidence (either direct or indirect) in support of arguments.

• Ergo, there must be empirical evidence in support of the assertion that God exists. Otherwise, there can be no objective morals, and therefore anything is permitted.

Conclusion:

Since God must exist (otherwise there are no morals and anything is permitted), then there must be empirical evidence for His existence. Finding none, it is therefore necessary to pretend that some exists, or to make some up. Otherwise there can be no objective basis for morals, society will necessarily collapse into chaos, and we will all inevitably become insatiable, maniacal, cannibalistic, orgiastic mass murderers, rapists, and thieves.

It also seems to me that this is the reason why ethical philosophers now virtually unanimously agree that ethical prescriptions cannot be derived from statements derived from empirical science (i.e. "ought" cannot be derived from "is"). To do so not only conflates two separate domains of logic (i.e. deductive versus inductive), but also requires that there be empirical evidence for something (i.e. ethical prescriptions) that are not and cannot be justified by empirical analysis (i.e. the workings of nature). Yes, we can use empirical analysis to determine if our ethical prescriptions have brought about the goals which we have decided to pursue, but we cannot use empirical analysis to formulate those goals.

Notes:

[1] Unsupportable on the basis of empirical evidence, that is.

[2] An obvious corollary to this is that each and every one of God’s moral prescriptions is both objective and absolutely True, by definition. Hence the argument that anything God prescribes (such as the massacre of the Canaanites) is morally right, simply by virtue of His saying so.

[3] To be specific, arguments based purely on deductive (i.e. Aristotelian) logic have been largely superseded by arguments based on inductive logic.

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen

Evolution: Is Free Will An Illusion?

Every summer I teach a seminar course at Cornell in which we examine the historical, philosophical, religious, and scientific implications of evolutionary theory. This summer our seminar course will consider the question: Is free will an illusion?

On the 15th of July, 1838, Charles Darwin began a notebook which he labeled as “M”, in which he intended to write down his correspondence, discoveries, musings, and speculations on “Metaphysics on Morals and Speculations on Expression”. On page 27 of that notebook, he wrote

“…one doubts existence of free will every action determined by hereditary constitution, example of others or teaching of others. (…man…probably the only [animal] affected by various knowledge which is not heredetary & instinctive) & the others are learnt, what they teach by the same means & therefore properly no free will. [Emphasis added]

In his private musing on the question of free will, Darwin came to the conclusion that human free will is an illusion, and that all of our actions (and, by extension, our thoughts and intentions) are the result of our “hereditary constitution” and “the example…or teaching of others.”

Some evolutionary biologists, notably William Provine of Cornell University, have followed Darwin’s lead and asserted that human free will is an illusion. Most philosophers disagree, asserting that free will is the principle difference between humans and non-human animals. Many Christian theologians go further, asserting that free will is the foundation of all human action, without which no rational ethics or theology is possible.

In our seminar course this summer we will take up this debate by considering two alternative hypotheses: (1) that human free will is real and forms the basis for our morals and ethics, or (2) that human free will is an illusion, the capacity for which is a product of the same evolutionary processes that have shaped our anatomical and behavioral adaptations. Included in this debate will be an extended consideration of the hypothesis that the capacity for ethical decision making is an evolutionary adaptation that has evolved by natural selection. We will read from some of the leading authors on both sides of the subject, including George Ainslie, Daniel Dennett, Robert Kane, Daniel Wegner, and Edward O. Wilson. Our intent will be to sort out the various issues at play, and to come to clarity on how those issues can be integrated into a perspective of the interplay between philosophy and the natural sciences.

Here are some particulars for the course:

INTENDED AUDIENCE: This course is intended primarily for students in biology, history, philosophy, religious studies, and science & technology studies. The approach will be interdisciplinary, and the format will consist of in-depth readings across the disciplines and discussion of the issues raised by such readings.

PREREQUISITES: None, although a knowledge of general evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, and the philosophy of human free will would be useful.

DAYS, TIMES, & PLACES: The course will meet on Tuesday and Thursday evenings from 6:00 to 9:00 PM in Mudd Hall, Room 409 (The Whittaker Seminar Room), beginning on Tuesday 23 June 2009 and ending on Thursday 30 July 2009.

CREDIT & GRADES: The course will be offered for 4 hours of credit, regardless of which course listing students choose to register for. Unless otherwise noted, course credit in BIOEE 4670 / BSOC 4471 can be used to fulfill biology/science distribution requirements and HIST 4150 / STS 4471 can be used to fulfill humanities distribution requirements (check with your college registrar's office for more information). Letter grades for this course will be based on the quality of written work on original research papers written by students, plus participation in class discussion. All participants must be registered in the Cornell Six-Week Summer Session to attend class meetings and receive credit for the course (click here for for more information and to enroll for this course). Registration will be limited to the first 18 students who enroll for credit.

REQUIRED TEXTS:

Ainslie, G. (2008) Breakdown of Will, Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0521596947 (paperback: $34.99), 272 pages.

Dennett, D. (2004) Freedom Evolves, Penguin Books, ISBN: 0142003840 (paperback: $17.00), 368 pages.

Kane, R. (2005) A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford University Press (USA), ISBN: 019514970X (paperback: $19.95), 208 pages.

Wegner, D. (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will, MIT Press, ISBN-10: 0262731622 (paperback: $21.95), 419 pages.

Wilson, E. O. (2004) On Human Nature (Revised Edition), Harvard University Press, ISBN: 0674016386 (paperback: $22.00), 284 pages.

OPTIONAL TEXTS:

Darwin, Charles (E. O. Wilson, ed.) (2006) From So Simple a Beginning: Darwin's Four Great Books. W. W. Norton, ISBN-10: 0393061345 (hardcover, $39.95), 1,706 pages. Available online here.

Fisher, J., Kane, R., Pereboom, D., & Vargas, M. (2007) Four Views on Free Will, Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN: 1405134860 (paperback: $33.95), 240 pages.

Kane, R. (2001) Free Will (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy), Wiley-Blackwell, ISBN: 0631221026 (paperback: $33.95), 328 pages.

Wilson, E. O. (2000) Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (25th Anniversary Edition), Belknap Press, ISBN: 0674002350 (paperback: $44.00), 720 pages

Our summer seminar course is always fascinating, and often quite controversial (see this and this). Over the years we have explored many of the implications of Darwin's theory, and the participants have always found our discussions (perhaps they should be called "debates") enlightening. As always, the intent is not necessarily to reach unanimity, but rather for each participant to come to clarity on where they stand on the issues and to be able to defend that stance using evidence and rational argument.

So, please consider taking our seminar on free will this summer - the choice is yours!

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As always, comments, criticisms, and suggestions are warmly welcomed!

--Allen